A large part of studying political economy is learning to navigate from the specific to the general and back again. Studying specific cases and policies provide the foundation for general theories. However, general theories must always be held loosely, refined, and adjusted for differing contexts. In such a way, general principles are useful for directing research and formulating questions.
With that in mind, I present 10 theses I have formulated as part of my study of the Middle East North Africa (MENA) political economy this past semester. They are meant to provide framing for ongoing discussion and study rather than be fixed principles.
1. Different numbers mean different things.
This lesson was driven home in preparing for a presentation on military spending in the Middle East. While many consider America to be the biggest military spender in the world, this is only based on one number: total dollars spent.
However, this number does not reflect the tax burden of the military, nor does it indicate the capacity of the American economy to sustain a certain level of military preparedness. Defense spending as a percentage of GDP, or as per capita spending, are numbers that indicate economic costs of defense and potential tax burdens. On both these counts, America is not the top country – Saudi Arabia is.
These numbers begin to get at how defense spending interacts with a political and economic system, and allows for a better comparison between countries.
2. Social contracts are fundamental to the nation-state system.
Social contract theory is a phrase deeply rooted in Western Enlightenment thought, particularly English Enlightenment thought. However, what thinkers like Hobbes and Locke touch on is a general political principle: political regimes rule by tacit agreement with a population. Such an agreement is contractual, whether written or not, and places demands on both ruler and ruled.
Politics, then, becomes the process by which those agreements are defined, understood, changed and replaced. And those agreements are behind much of the political systems in the MENA region.
3. General constitutions > specific constitutions.
Related to the point above, some social contracts are written down in the form of constitutions, but not all constitutions fulfill the same function. In fact, some do more than others. In comparing the American constitution with those of Morocco, Saudi Arabia and others, I find that the MENA constitutions are generally much more detailed and specific in their language than the American constitution.
This seems to pose a historical problem for many MENA countries as constitutions seem to get replaced or heavily amended with any change of government. This can create legitimacy deficits as the social contract is either in flux or dominated by a regime without recourse for a population.
I would suggest that shorter, generally worded constitutions have the advantage of creating a broader base of agreement within a society, which can stand the test of time. In a region longing for stability, this would seem like preferable approach.
4. Economic efficiency =/= Political efficacy.
Discussions and readings surrounding rentier state theory got me thinking about this issue. In theory, rentier systems seem quite efficient and straightforward: The state controls dominant resources and equitably distributes the proceeds for the good of the country (infrastructure, grants, welfare, etc.).
However, rentier theorists all note the lack of economic diversity that can happen and the “democracy deficit” that can ensue when the government controls the “commanding heights” of a nation’s economy.
Simply put, a (seemingly) efficient economic model can have political repercussions that undercut political efficacy.
5. Reform is not just a liberal word.
The book chapter I wrote this last semester evaluates the post uprisings political context of the Maghreb. I found it interesting to note the regularity that regimes and reformers in the Arab uprisings called for reform. It got me thinking, “What do they mean by ‘reform’?”
I concluded that regimes and reforms generally mean the same thing – policy change, but often for different reasons.
Liberal reformers tend to speak of the term as a move towards a more equitable, liberal political system. Regimes, however, use it to refer to making necessary, even just, adjustments to existing structures. The result, is that ‘reform’ is often used in the region as a tool of regime survival as opposed to regime change.
6. Economy and governance are constantly in tension and, therefore, never efficient.
Economists intellectually note that there’s no such thing as a perfectly efficient economy, but that doesn’t seem to stop them from trying to create one. However, in the political economy context, I think we can catch a glimpse of one reason economies are inefficient: Governance has a different set of objectives that economics.
While both, ideally, seek to support human flourishing, they go about it different ways. Governance is concerned with the organization and interaction of individuals, while economics is looking at the exchange and distribution of goods. The two are closely related, but in their differences, there is a tension that can manifest itself in economic mismanagement, or political conflict.
7. Governance by economics leads to anarchy or technocracy.
Considering the tension between governance and economics, it shouldn’t be surprising when political ideologies emerge that emphasize one over the other. However, that is problematic. Attempting to organize people and mediate their interactions by economic means can create a degree of anarchy where the economy overwhelms the power to govern, or a technocracy where an elite seek to manage the economy and its connected society as a massive whole.
There’s not a particularly good example of this type of balance in the MENA region, but I note it here simply as a comparison to the other side of the equation: Economics by governance.
8. Economics by governance leads to autocracy or communism.
This is essentially the rentier model, as well as the varying forms of socialism, communism and other control-economy models. In this model, the government subsumes the economy and deploys it as a political tool in the social contract bargaining process.
Gengler’s work in Bahrain identified this exact process as the Bahraini government utilized rents to curry Sunni support while controlling its Shi’a population and keeping it on the political periphery.
9. Economic trends can obscure social rifts.
The Political Economy of the Middle East and the Arab Human Development Report both indicate that many observers missed the signs of the Arab uprisings, citing instead improving macroeconomic trends.
The lesson that should be taken from here is that economic trends do not paint a whole picture, particularly when they’re region-wide and one is trying to assess the political health of an individual country.
Though some economic markers looked good in the region, many social markers suggested political societies were unsteady.
10. We need to consider MENA in a post-oil context.
For decades, MENA has been understood as the oil region. The explanation for conflict, rentier economies, deep American presence, and other phenomena is generally traced back to oil. However, the uprisings of 2011 place oil in the background.
Rather, people who took to the streets were concerned about food and water scarcity, the lack of jobs, public corruption, and housing prices. Does oil have a role to play in these things? Of course. However, it’s not the only scarce resource in the region, nor does it pose the only security hazard for ruling regimes. Additionally, many countries are actively seeking to reduce their oil dependency. New models and angles of inquiry are thus needed for future study of the region.