One of the fun parts about my class this semester is that the professor is asking us to take the theories and data that we interact with and apply them to current situations such as the American response to Russia in Ukraine.
The assignment last week was to use the Balance of Power theory to predict/prescribe what America’s actions should be regarding Russian activity in Ukraine.
For over a year now, Russia has been waging a low grade war of territorial acquisition in eastern Ukraine by supplying Russian rebels with funds and weapons. While Russia continues to deny the presence of their own troops in Ukraine, most of the NATO countries aren’t buying it.
Now if you’re an American, you may have wondered at different points, “When did the Cold War start up again?” Given this new uptick in Russian-American tensions, it seems like the “good old” days are back with a vengeance. However, the world is a very different place from what it was in the Cold War days.
America and Russia may have the top two militaries in the world (see a cool infographic on the world’s top militaries here), but does that necessarily mean that they’re on a collision course for war? Not according to Balance of Power theory.
Where the Situation in Ukraine Stands Now
This post is “going to press” a week after I’ve written it, so I’m sure the situation will change in some minor ways, but here are the critical elements:
- French and German leaders are in Kiev to try to negotiate a ceasefire and final settlement.
- Russian-backed rebels have been pushing forward in Eastern Ukraine backed by some of Russia’s newest military hardware (good time to test things!).
- The US has been supplying “non-lethal” aid to the Ukrainian government, but has begun considering whether or not to change that approach, something Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko is desperately calling for.
What Kind of Power Balance Does America Want?
I’ve been reading John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Power Politics wherein the theorist of “offensive realism” lays out his theory regarding great power behavior.
According to Mearsheimer’s theory, America has three basic foreign policy goals:
- National survival.
- Prevention of the emergence of a competing regional hegemon.
- Balance against potential hegemons in other global regions.
With these goals in mind, America also has to take into account that it has oceans between it and it’s two closest great power competitors: Russia and China.
Mearsheimer argues that the most stable form of the international system is that of a balanced bipolar world (think Cold War), or a balanced multipolar world (think Europe 1919-138).
Applying this theoretical framework to the Ukrainian situation, then, America has two basic goals:
- Contain China since it’s a greater threat and is surrounded by weaker allies (Japan and South Korea).
- “Pass the buck” of containing Russia to NATO allies like France and Germany (do you really think those respective states went to Kiev this last week just because they had EU concerns?).
Don’t Forget Who the Real Threat Is
Why such a stance? The inevitable outcomes is that Ukraine will not be getting Crimea, or any other lost land back anytime soon. Unfortunately, European powers (and the US) have a history of backing out on a minor power if said minor power is getting abused by a great power the others don’t see as a threat (and that is exactly what Russia is).
Why won’t America go to help? Because Russia is a “paper tiger,” a great power that is weakening, despite it’s efforts to modernize it’s military.
- The Russian population has been shrinking for the last decade.
- It’s economy has nosedived between sanctions and the fall in oil prices.
- And their climbing military budget is outstripping the economy’s ability to fund it.
China, on the other hand, continues to grow it’s economy, has a massive manpower reserve, and continues to increase it’s military budget year to year.
China qualifies as a potential hegemon, which means that it’s rise must be contained since it doesn’t seem like it will be prevented from achieving the hegemonic status that it craves.
This creates a delicate situation with Russia since it may look to build a deeper alliance with China as a way to counterbalance America and the EU.
The problem for America, then, is how to check Russia without driving Putin into China’s arms?
An Old Game Calls For a Tried and True Play
In order to maintain it’s power advantage on China, America must address Russia two ways:
- Allow European allies to do the heavy lifting in confronting Russia in Ukraine (a combination of Mearsheimer’s “pass the buck” and “bloodletting” notions).
- Refocus on the China pivot and continue to bolster allies in East Asia and strengthening ties with India.
Ukraine is squarely a European issue and should remain so. While European powers cannot do a lot without American financial and military support, the very presence of NATO on the Russian doorstep is enough to keep Russia penned in and restrict Putin’s aggression to a fairly narrow sphere. His imploding economy will ensure that that aggression is tempered.
America has historically followed a “buck passing” strategy with European problems whenever there’s been power parity on that continent. Considering that where things stand now, there’s no reason to get all jumpy with Putin.
In fact, given the potential for a stronger Russia-China axis should we get more deeply involved, we have every reason to sit this hopak out.