Academically speaking, diplomacy is a subfield of foreign policy, which is a subfield of international relations, which is a subfield of World Politics. That’s right, we’re way down the rabbit hole here.
The study has been quite helpful in developing my analytical tool box and refining my dissertation proposal. Of more practical use to the general reader, however, would be a summary of lessons that I’ve gained from the study. I provided a similar list of theses after a semester studying political economy. So, in the same spirit, I offer these thoughts as a way to more constructively wade through the partisan jeremiads related to America’s current method of diplomacy in the Trump era.
1. What counts for foreign policy “experience.
When people ask me what my criteria for selecting a viable presidential candidate, I tell them that foreign policy is my number one criteria. This is because the presidential powers outlined in Constitution make foreign policy an area the president has the most unilateral power and influence in. The trick, however, is to identify what foreign policy experience looks like. Is it just good ideas on foreign policy? Awareness? Just what kind of experience are we talking about? As we enter a new presidential election cycle it’s really important to consider this.
The Democratic field, for example, is very crowded and everybody wants to separate themselves from the pack by noting international experience of one kind or another. But is that sufficient?
I listened to a lecture this past semester that provided a really helpful “experience” metric by looking at how different presidents have utilized the National Security Council and other organs of foreign policy decision-making in the US government. The presidents the speaker identified as being the most effective users of National Security Council seem to have had some of the more effective foreign policies.
Makes sense, but here’s what grabbed my attention: Those presidents tended to be presidents who had decision-making experience in an international context prior to becoming president. A key element, therefore, to measure presidential candidates’ foreign policy capability is to look at their resume and consider their decision-making experience and the context in which it happens. If it happens in the international setting, then it stands to reason that they will have a better grasp on foreign policy and diplomacy.
2. Contextual awareness matters in diplomacy
This point links to the one above. The reason why international decision-making experience is so crucial for diplomatic leaders like secretaries of state and the president is because diplomacy and the execution of foreign policy requires deep contextual awareness. One of the most difficult diplomatic settings, the Arab-Israeli conflict, provides an excellent case study.
former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat both demonstrated their respectively very deep contextual awareness that allowed them to recognize what they could and could not reasonably accomplish in their time and place. It not only informed their approach to negotiations but it also informed their approach to public diplomacy as they had a better grasp on how to communicate to their broader audiences and frame the ideas that they were seeking to implement. This contextual awareness is critical to informing the decision-making process.
One cannot be a mere ideologue in a diplomatic setting, or assume that their counterpart will just “get” them. It’s helpful, then, to consider what “contextual awareness” involves.
Again, Sadat and Kissinger both point the way. Both have very deep and detailed knowledge of history (Kissinger’s knowledge on China is one such example) and bring that to bear in their analysis. Additionally, they have a way of clearly communicating complex subjects and using language that is both descriptive and accessible to the diverse audiences they’re addressing (Sadat’s speech to the Israeli Knesset is a good example). In other words, they’re not just culturally and historically aware in an intellectual way, but in a very practical communicative way as well.
3. Give your opponent something to bargain with
Of critical importance to diplomats negotiating conflict resolution is the ability to identify the “ripe moment.” Ripe moments are understood to be those moments where parties to a conflict understand that they are in a lose-lose situation and have to come to negotiating table. In order to get there, though, third parties have to be able to correctly identify that both parties perceive themselves to be in that lose-lose position. In a world where governments and their leaders seeks to save face and put their strongest foot forward, this can be a really tricky proposition with the potential for a lot of false starts.
Critical to seizing the ripe moment, then, is giving your opponent something to bargain with. That doesn’t necessarily mean giving something away from your own bargaining chips, but at least acknowledging and allowing for your opponent to bring something to the table rather than turn the negotiation into a zero-sum game.
This is particularly relevant to the US-North Korean diplomacy as we recognize that North Korea has very little to negotiate with. The other area of application, here, is to evaluate the use of sanctions as diplomatic tool. Certainly sanctions can work, but there should be recognition that at some point they fail to work simply because you’re removing bargaining chips from your opponent’s side. This may lead the opponent to double down rather than bargain.
4. The “Diplomacy Gap”
Diplomacy is about more than just nation-nation relations. It involves relations with international organizations and multiple countries at the same time. This dynamic is embodied in the multilateral diplomacy surrounding the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). In studying this topic this semester, I noticed the presence of a talent and information gap that exists between developing countries and developed countries.
In some ways, that’s to be expected, but it’s even more noticeable within the developing world between low-income and middle-income countries. For a quick visual example, you could combine the look and feel of Egypt’s 2018 Voluntary National Review for the SDGs to Ethiopia’s 2017 document. The differences in aesthetics, details and content are noticeable.
The recognition that there could be a diplomacy gap that emerges between countries that have greater amounts of economic heft suggests such countries can deploy more diplomatic missions. This may look like being able to develop both multilateral representation at regional and international decision-making bodies as well as having the resources to open greater numbers of embassies and consulates around the world.
This allows countries that have more resourcing for their diplomatic corps to pursue bilateral, regional and global diplomacy. This arguably allows for greater influence in global affairs while poor countries need to rely on the effectiveness of their diplomacy at locations like the UN. This may make them developing countries great global diplomats, but it may put those same countries at disadvantages within their own immediate neighborhoods.
5. Leveraging multilateral diplomacy to advance bilateral “relations”
The Diplomacy Gap doesn’t just put a poor country at a disadvantage with its immediate neighbors within a region, but it puts it at a distinct disadvantage in relationship to great powers like the United States, Russia and China.
I think this is a very relevant point to consider because one can start to see the diplomatic game board in terms of great powers taking multilateral diplomacy less seriously than smaller powers. Then, in bilateral relations, great powers can act very seriously and place a lot of pressure on smaller countries to more or less do their bidding.
China seems to follow this exact game plan where they use the rhetoric of global responsibility and leadership in the United Nations and other international bodies, but then use very aggressive economic diplomacy in their bilateral relations to advance their interests and even gain control over key infrastructure in developing countries. This demonstrates a very real consequence to the Diplomacy Gap, one that puts developing countries at a distinct economic disadvantage which has a trickle-down effect of actually undercutting their development efforts.
6. Civil vs. Foreign Service
Comparative diplomacy, how different countries he general structure of the American Foreign Service and its different career tracks. I’ve been very interested in considering what a career in foreign policy and diplomacy could look like for me and have largely focused my efforts on evaluating the Foreign Service as the most obvious entry point into public service absent befriending a future president and getting some great appointment.
However, in reading about the work of Foreign Service Officers, I became aware of the second area of foreign policy and diplomacy that plays a crucial supporting role to the FSOs: The Civil Service. I honestly did not know that these phrases described two separate elements of America’s foreign policy establishment.
As something of an observational experiment, I went to USAJobs.gov to see how the government recruits for and describes these two tracks. Sure enough, FSOs had a completely different application process and web portal while civil servants used the USAJobs.gov site to apply. In the foreign policy space, these civil servants carried out analysis, research, and strategic work of the type I’m interested in.
Getting diplomacy right
Diplomacy is not an easy thing. It’s both art and science. It’s also luck and leverage. In other words, it’s deeply human. How countries structure their approaches to diplomacy certainly shapes outcomes, but outcomes are far from systemically pre-determined. The individuals who represent their country, the diplomats, play a crucial role in success or failure. How diplomacy get’s measured, then, is as much a study in history and biography as it is one of social science.